Sheila Smith Highlights Major Shifts in Japan’s New Security Strategy

Amid rising tensions across the Indo-Pacific, Japan struggles with a unique challenge: How to cultivate a Self-Defense Force that can successfully deter threats to national security within a constitution that theoretically restricts the maintenance of a military with war potential?

Despite the public’s reluctance to revise the pacifistic Article 9, in December Japanese leadership unveiled a robust new security and national defense strategy, marking what has been called the biggest strategy change since the end of World War II.

On March 6, 2023, Dr. Sheila Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations visited Columbia University to speak about this groundbreaking shift and its implications for the region. Her remarks, at the inaugural event of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute’s new Japan Research Program (JRP), offered an in-depth look at these changes, the conditions that precipitated them, and the geopolitical challenges that lie ahead for Japan.

News headlines about Japan’s new security strategy have focused on the plan to double its military budget over the next five years to 2% of GDP, and intentions to develop counterstrike capability. This expansion would involve the controversial purchase of long-range missiles.

In her opening presentation, Smith noted also plans to include a new permanent joint operational command that will be formed for the three services of the Self-Defense Force; the stockpiling of munitions and fuels; and development in space, cyber, and human resources. These changes, she said, reflect an “across the board government and party effort to rethink what Japan needed to do to maintain its security.”
 
“Wholesale is not normally what Japanese policymakers do,” Smith explained. “But the language in this document is, ‘Hey, pay attention. We are changing.’”
 
Despite military shifts, diplomacy is the cornerstone of the new strategy. This priority is evidenced by recent efforts to strengthen relations with Quad allies in the US, India, and Australia, as well as partners in Europe and Southeast Asia. Smith mentioned the landing of Japanese Self-Defense Force jets in the Philippines as a notable public display of diplomacy––one that flies in the face of historical sensitivities stemming from Japan’s imperialist past.

Surprisingly, she said, beyond predictable concern about implementation and tax hikes, there was very little public opposition to the plan domestically. And Smith suggested “there is much more willingness on the part of Japanese policymakers, politicians, and the public to invest more in Japanese capabilities––not at the behest of the United States, but because many in Japan think that that's required––not only for Japan's national defenses, but also to make sure the alliance is sustainable over the long run.”

After her presentation, Smith sat down for a conversation with Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science Gerald L. Curtis, director of the JRP. Curtis highlighted the circumstances leading up to the strategy shift and suggested that the public’s acceptance of the new strategy comes, in part, because they see no other option. He noted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and doubt among Japanese leadership that the US could be depended on to follow through on its security reassurances. “What happens if the US domestic political situation changes in ways that are inimical to Japanese interests?” He asked, citing the past administration of Donald Trump, who is currently campaigning for re-election in 2024.

But Curtis also added a caveat: “The national security strategy is a policy document. It's a piece of paper or several pieces of paper. But what actually happens is a question of implementation.”

Smith agreed, adding that Japan still faces the challenge of paying for this budget increase, and suggested that funding also does not guarantee the capabilities or reforms sought will be able to overcome bureaucratic hurdles.

Ultimately, “this doubling of Japanese investment is by no means going to be able to shift dramatically the regional military balance of power,” Smith said. “But it will begin to set Japan on a little bit of a different footing.”